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COOPERATIVE MILK MARKETING AND RESTRAINT
OF TRADE
By JoHN HANNA*
The almost uninterrupted series of legal victories for agricultural cooperative associations was interrupted recently by
the Court of Appeals of Stark County, Ohio, which affirmed the
judgment of the Common Pleas Court in Stark County Milk
Producers!Association v. Tabeling, D. B. A., The Massillon Pure
Milk Company.' The plaintiff is a producers' non-profit cooperative association and the defendant a milk dealer. The
parties in 1928 signed a one-year contract under which the
dealer agreed to buy milk solely from the Association. The contract was to run thereafter from year to year unless terminated
by notice from either party during a certain period in each
year. In order to give each producer a uniform price for milk
of like quality, the agreement set out in some detail the method
of compensating the producer.
Milk has three markets in this territory. The first involves
fluid milk for home consumption. This is sold in bottles and
other containers directly to the consumers. Milk sold in this
class receives the highest price. The second is the market for
cream and chocolate milk. The cream is used for butter and
other milk products. The milk in the second class receives an
intermediate price. The third class is milk for the ice cream or
surplus mnarket which receives the lowest price. The Association
might have taken deliveries from the farmers, sold the milk
directly to various consumers for prices determined by the
Association, and distributed the proceeds, less overhead and
reserves, to the producers. Such an arrangement would have
eliminated the dealers entirely. In the alternative the Association might have taken deliveries from the producers, and sold
the milk to dealers at prices depending upon the market supplied by the dealers. The Association in fact substantially followed the second plan, slightly modified to continue existing
machinery for receipt and distribution of milk and payment of
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law; A. B.,
Dartmouth (1914); A. M., Stanford (1915); LL. B., Harvard (1918);
contributor to various legal periodicals; member District of Columbia
bar.
,No. 24,801, now pending in the Supreme Court of Ohio, on writ
of certiorari. Reversed and remanded, Dec. 26, 1934.
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proceeds. The price for dealers was fixed each month following
a meeting of representatives of producers and dealers. Milk
was purchased directly from the farmers by the dealers. Some
dealers sold milk chiefly in one class, some about equally in all
classes. At the end of each month the accountants for the Association determined the total volume sold by the dealers in each
class. As an example it might be found that 100,000 pounds of
milk iad been sold during September, of which 50,000 pounds
had been sold as fluid milk, 25,000 pounds in the cream market,
and 25,000 pounds in the surplus market mostly for ice cream.
If the dealer were charged $1.50 per hundred for milk sold in
the fluid market, $1.00 for milk sold in the cream, butter and
cheese market, and 50 cents for milk sold in the ice cream market, the price to be paid the farmer would work out as follows:
50,000 lbs. at $1.50 per cwt .........................................
25,000 lbs. at 1.00 per cwt .........................................
25,000 lbs. at .50 per cwt .........................................

$750
250
125

Total ....................................

$1,125

The result of dividing $1,125, or the total proceeds, by the
total pounds sold (100,000), would give the blended price per
hundred pounds. In the illustration the price is $1.121/2. That
is the amount the farmer would receive irrespective of the use
to which his milk was put. In other words the producer receives
an average, or as it is usually termed in the milk trade, a
blended price. This is the price the dealer pays the farmer.
The Association does not take deliveries nor make payments.
The net account between dealer and Association remains to
be settled. If the dealer has made all his sales in Class I he
pays $1.50. If he has made sales in different classes he pays the
class price for the amount sold in each class. Since he must in
any event pay the farmer $1.121/2, he either owes the Association an equalization payment or is entitled to receive one. If
he is a dealer in fluid milk selling for home consumption he
owes the Association 371/2 cents per hundred more than he has
paid the farmers. If he is selling to ice cream makers or buying
directly for such use, the Association owes him the difference
between what he has paid the farmer and the class price of 50
cents, or 621/2 cents per hundred pounds. If the dealer has
sold 10,000 pounds in each class his account is stated as follows:
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10,000 lbs. at $1.50 per cwt ................................ :.....
10,000 lbs. at 1.00 per cwt .........................................
10,000 lbs. at .50 per cwt ........................................

$150
100
50

30,000

$300
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This means the dealer has sold his milk for an average of
$1.00 a hundred. Since he has paid $1.12Y2 he is entitled to a
payment from the Association of 12Y2 cents a hundred or
$37.50.
In the Stark County Milk Association case the Association
and the dealer operated under the contract for several years
following 1928. The dealer sold most of his milk to domestic
consumers, that is, in Class I, and was customarily indebted to
the Association. Finally a dispute arose, the dealer refused to
settle an account and the Association sued for the balance
claimed to be due, or about $1,300. The defendant's answer
denied generally he owed the money and attacked the contract
as uncertain, lacking in mutuality, and illegal because being in
unreasonable restraint of trade. The points about uncertainty
and mutuality were abandoned. The defendant seems to have
introduced no evidence to contradict the plaintiff's account
sheets and other evidence of the sum claimed to be due. The
record is extremely unsatisfactory but notwithstanding the fact
that the issue of damages seems to have been left to the jury, an
examination of the charge of the Common Pleas Court indicates
that the real issue which the Court instructed the jury to determine was whether the contract was an unreasonable restraint
of trade and hence void.
. Assuming that the only issue in the case was whether the
Association's contract and perhaps also its operations amounted
to an unreasonable restraint ol trade, the Ohio decision seems
erroneous for three reasons: First, in the absence of any state
law specifically forbidding recovery on such contracts as the
defendant signed, the defendant was liable to pay for the milk
he had received even if the Association's operations were in
unreasonable restraint of trade. Second, even if any of the
selling contracts by an Association whose operations amounted
to an unreasonable restraint of trade were void, the question
whether a particular contract, the terms of which were not in
dispute, was an unreasonable restraint of trade, was for the
court rather than the jury. Third, even if the defendant was
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entitled to raise the restraint of trade point and even if abstractly. considered the question of reasonableness of the contract was one of fact for the jury, in this particular case the
contracts and. operations of the Cooperative Association were
so patently not an unreasonable restraint of trade that the court
in any event should have directed a verdict for the plaintiff.
I.
The Ohio anti-trust statutes as they affect co-operative
associations consist of the Valentine Anti-Trust law2 and the
later Cooperative Marketing statute.3 The Anti-Trust law defines a trust as a combination for creating or carrying out restrictions on trade or commerce, limiting production, preventing
competition and fixing prices. Besides criminal penalties the
Act provides for remedies by injunctions, and quo warranto to
restrain or dissolve domestic corporations. Foreign corporations violating the statute may be deprived of the privilege of
doing business in the state. The only part of the act relating
to contracts is § 63934 which reads as follows:
"A conlract or agreement in violation of any provision of this
chapter is void and not enforceable either at law or equity."
The cooperative law provides that marketing contracts between
an association and its members and other agreements authorized
by the cooperative statute are not in restraint of trade. For the
purpose of the first part of the discussion the cooperative
statute may be disregarded. It may even be assumed that the
general operations of the association were in restraint of trade
and that it was existing in violation of the anti-trust statute.
Nevertheless, if it entered into a contract for the sale of a commodity and the buyer received it, the buyer could not avoid liability by alleging that the association was in restraint of trade.
When the law says that contracts in restraint of trade are void,
it means contracts to combine, to restrict competition, to fix
prices, to reduce production, and to do other things condemned
by the Act.
Page's Ann. Gen. Code, Sections 6390-6402-1.
'Ibid., Sections 10186-1 to 26.

Ibid.
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In Jackson v. Akron Brick Association5 the brick association attempted to sue an alleged buyer in the association partners.hip name. While the Supreme Court held that if the
plaintiff was an illegal combination it could not use the name
of the combination as plaintiff in an action, the Court admitted
that the persons constituting the partnership could sue in their
individual names. *On this point the Court approved the charge
of the lower court as follows:
"In our jurisprudence it is no defense to say that the contract was
made with a bad man, or with persons engaged in prosecuting acts contrary to law, or the policy of the state, unless the contract grows immediately out of and in connection with an illegal or immoral act.
A clear distinction exists in law, as well as ethics, between a contract
entered into to do an unlawful or immoral act, or to promote a course
of conduct contrary to the policy of the state, and a contract entered
into for a legitimate purpose, though made with persons who commit
unlawful and immoral acts or promote schemes contrary to good
policy."

In Hinner v. Lake Shore and Michigan Sonthern Railway
Co. the railroad was suing in equity to enjoin trading in nontransferable return trip ticket coupons. The defense was that
the railroad was a part of a combination in restraint of trade.
The Court in affirming a judgment granting the injunction said
in part:
6

"From the assumption that the companies composing the passenger
association had entered into an unlawful combination in restraint of
competition, it results that their conduct may be the subject of inquiry
in the nature of a quo warranto, and that courts of equity will also
refuse to aid in the enforcement of the contract under which such combination is formed. . . .
But a court of equity is not an avenger
of wrongs committed at large *by those who resort to it for relief, however careful it may be to withhold its approval from those which are
involved in the subject matter of the suit and which prejudicially affect
the rights of one against whom relief is sought. . . . In the present
case the railway company did not count upon the illegal contract, nor
did it, in any manner, ask the court to approve the validity of that
contract. The tickets against whose fraudulent use the injunction was
granted were issued by the company in the usual course of the business
for which it was organized; the stipulations against their transfer
rested upon the consideration of a reduction of the rates of carriage;
they contained no stipulation contrary to any statute either of the
United States or of the state of Ohio, or in contravention of public
policy, nor was there anything in the conduct of the company by which
any right of the original defendants was prejudiced."
553 Oh. State 303 (1895).
669 Oh. State 339 (1903).

K. L. J.-2
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While the precise case was in equity the real question was the

enforceability of the original contracts.
These holdings received an application of the sort that
should have been made in the Stark County Milk Association
case, in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Roser Runkle Co.,7 where
in an action to recover for goods sold, the defendant alleged the
plaintiff was a combination in restraint of trade and existing in
violation of the Valentine Anti-Trust Law. The plaintiff demurred and the demurrer was sustained. The court said in
part:
"The fact that the plaintiff was a member of a trust and combination in restraint of trade is not a defense at common law nor by statute
to an action for goods sold by it, even though the price of those goods'
was fixed by the trust agreement. The plaintiff's cause of action is in
no sense dependent upon or affected by the alleged trust agreement.
That agreement the defendant was not a party to and it is entirely collateral to the transaction sued upon. There is no allegation in the
answer tending to show that the sale in question was tainted with any
illegality or was contrary to public policy, and the court is not called
upon to give effect to any such transaction. If the statute made void
all sales made by an unlawful trust, or authorized the purchaser of
goods from a trust to plead its unlawful character as a defense, a
different question would be presented. That the plaintiff is a member
of an unlawful trust, etc., is no defense to an action for goods sold by
it, has been decided many times."

The sort of anti-trust law under which the defendant might
have asserted a defense is illustrated by the Illinois statutes
which was before the Supreme Court of the United States in
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.9 The statute was much like
the Valentine Act of Ohio in its description of conduct amounting to a restraint of trade, in its provisions for injunction and
quo warranto, and in its section making contracts in violation
of the act void. Unlike the Ohio Act it added the following
section:
"Section 10. Any purchaser of any article or commodity, from 4ny
person, from corporations, or association of persons, or of two of them,
transacting business contrary to the provisions of this act shall not
be liable for the price or payment of such article or commodity, and
may plead this act as a defense to any suit for such price or payment."
10 Oh. State N. P. (N. S.) 596 (1910).
SIll. Laws 1893, 188. Hurd's Rev. Stat. III (1899), 618.
11 84 U. S. 540, 22 Sup. Ct. 431, 46 L. Ed. 679 (1902). See John
Hanna, Cooperative Associations and the Public (1930), 29 Mich.
L. Rev. 148, 176.
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The Union Sewer Pipe Company sued Connolly on promissory notes given for sewer pipe he had bought. He defended
on the grouna, among others, that the Company could not collect the notes because they were Illinois contracts and because
the plaintiff was an unlawful trust. Under the Illinois law a
person who bought an article from a violator of the Anti-Trust
Act could not be obliged to pay. The defendant also argued
that the sales contract was void at common law and under the
Sherman Law. Since the Supreme Court held the Illinois law
unconstitutional because of a section exempting agricultural
products or live stock the decisive question was whether, assuming the plaintiff's general operations were a violation of the
common law in restraint of trade or the Federal Anti-Trust Law,
that fact enabled the defendant to refuse to pay for goods he
had purchased. The Supreme Court categorically rejected the
defendant's contention:
"The defense cannot be maintained. Assuming, as defendants contend, that the alleged combination was illegal if tested by the principles of the common law, still it would not follow that they could, at
common law, refuse to pay for pipe bought by them under special contracts with the plaintiff. The illegality of such combination did not
prevent the plaintiff corporation from selling pipe that it obtained from
its constituent companies or either of them. It could pass a title by
a sale to any one desiring to buy, and the buyer could not justify a
refusal to pay for what he bought and received by proving that the
seller had previously, in the prosecution of its business, entered into an
illegal combination with others in reference generally to the sale of
Akron pipe."

The Court likewise rejected the same defense based on the
Sherman law saying:
"Much of what has just been said in reference to the first special
defense, based on the common law, is applicable to this part of the
case. If the contract between the plaintiff corporation and the other
named corporations, persons and companies, or the combination
thereby formed, was illegal under the act of Congress, then all those,
whether persons, corporations or associations, directly connected therewith, became subject to the penalties prescribed by Congress. But the
act does not declare illegal or void any sale made by such combination,
or by its agents, of property it acquired or which came into its possession for the purpose of being sold--such property not being at the time
in the course of transportation from one state to another or to a
foreign country. The buyer could not refuse to comply with his contract of purchase upon the ground that the seller was an illegal combination which might be restrained or suppressed in the mode prescribed by the act of Congress; for Congress did not declare that a
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combination illegally formed under the act of 1890 should not, in the
conduct of its business, become the owner of property which it might
sell to whomsoever wished to buy it. So that there is no necessary
legal connection here between the sale of pipe to the defendants by the
plaintiff corporation and the alleged arrangement made by it with
other corporations, companies and firms. The contracts under which the
pipe in question was sold were, as already said, collateral to the arrangement fbr combination referred to, and this is not an action to
enforce the terms of such arrangement. That combination may have
been illegal, and yet the sale to the defendants was valid."

The Valentine Act in Section 639310 adds nothing to the
general rule that a contract made in violation of statute is void
and no recovery can be had upon it. In the Cooperative Association's suit to collect for milk bought by a dealer other considerations are controlling. The Association is not suing to enforce any illegal restraint of trade. It is trying to make a milk
man pay for milk he has already sold to customers. The defendant's purchases had no necessary or direct connection with the
alleged oppressive operations of the Association. The contract
between the Association and the dealer was proven without any
reference to the arrangements between the Association and producers or other dealers, by which it is charged the association
unreasonably restrained trade. The contract between the Association and the dealer was in every sense collateral to the alleged
agreements by which the defendant alleged the Association violated the Valentine Act.
II.
Assuming, which was not the fact, that the Ohio law had
provided that if one makes a purchase from one who contracts
in unreasonable restraint of trade, he may refuse to pay for his
purchase, the court should have decided what was an unreasonable restraint of trade and not left the question to the jury.
Contracts between cooperative marketing associations, and
their members, and other contracts in furtherance of the powers
of the associations are presumptively valid under the cooperative marketing statutes. The only contracts that are invalid
are those which unreasonably restrain trade. Looking at the
question as a matter of common sense it is an obvious absurdity
to allow each jury to pass on the question of reasonableness,
i. e. the legality of the contracts. In the present Ohio milk
'-'Bupra, note (2).
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controversy one might find the Stark County Association suing
a dozen dealers. The association in the next county might be
suing an equal number who had contracted with it. Twentyfour juries might be impaneled within twenty-four miles. In
some instances, as in the principal case, all sorts of irrelevant
and prejudicial matter might be admitted without exception.
In some cases the association might be unpopular for any of a
number of reasons having nothing to do with the justice of its
claims. In other cases the association might be popular. It is
inevitable that there would be no unanimity in the jury verdicts.
Since by hypothesis the juries are finding a question of fact,
the higher courts could not review the verdicts. The result is
that a single association might be a combination in restraint of
trade in half the townships in the county or half the time in each
township.
The discussion of principles and the examination of decisions involving a jury's province in restraint of trade cases must
discriminate according to the different situations where the
question arises. In a criminal prosecution where the facts are
disputed there may be an ultimate fact as well as subsidiary
facts to be found by the jury. And in an action for civil damages by one alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade where the
facts are disputed, the jury must find the facts. But in these
agricultural cooperative association cases, as in the Stark
County Milk Association case, generally the facts are undisputed.
The contract is admitted. There is no substantial dispute about
the operations of the association. The only issue is whether the
contract taken in connection with the activities of the association
is so much against public policy as to amount to an unreasonable
restraint of trade. How can any jury, much less a series of
juries, make any authoritative finding as to what is public
policy.? Thus analyzed, the conclusion is patent that such a determiaation is not within a jury's functions.
Baron Parke's opinion in Wallan v. May 1 emphatically
expresses the common law rule that the question of reasonableness of the restraint is for the court, not the jury. The case involved a contract by a surgeon not to compete in certain territory. The Court found this restraint unreasonable. The plainll Afeeson & Welsby 653, 668, 152 Eng. Rep. 967, 973 (Exch.,
1843).
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tiff framed one of his pleas to present a jury question. Baron
Parke after quoting Tindal, C. J., "Contracts in restraint of
trade are, in themselves, if nothing shows them to be reasonable,
bad in the eye of the law" and further, "whatever restraint is
larger than the necessary protection of the party with whom the
contract is made, is unreasonable and void as being injurious to
the interests of the public on the grounds of public policy,''12
went on to find the restraint or the contract before him, unreasonable. He then added that the seventh plea was bad. "It
attempts to leave the matter of law, viz., the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the contract, to the jury. This is clearly a
question of law and was decided as such in Davis v. Mason,13
Horner v. Graves,14 Proctor v. Sargent,15 and Chesman v.
Nainby."16
The New York case of Cohen v. Berlin & Jones Envelope
Company' 7 directly involved the question of submitting to the
jury the question of the reasonableness of restraint of trade. In
tbe course of his opinion Judge Parker said:'8 "When the testimony was all in a question was presented whick the Court
alone could pass upon, nanely, whether the contract was nonenforcible because in restraint of trade, . . . that was the course
adopted by the trial court in Cummings v. Union. Blue Stone
Co. (164 N. Y. 401) and it accords, not only with reason
but with time-honored practice." (Italics the writer's.)
The Supreme Court of Illinois in Tarr v. Stearman,'9
which although an equity action, involved a contract alleged to
be in unreasonable restraint of trade, expressed unequivocally
the true doctrine in respect to the determination of the fact of
reasonableness. The Court said: "Every contract of this kind
must be judged according to its special circumstances, and
whether it is reasonable or contrary to public policy is a question of law." This statement was quoted with approval by the
2

Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 744 (1831).
"5 T. R. 118 1793).
14 Supra, note (12).
T M. & G. 25 (1840).
162 Ld. Raym. 1456 (1726).
"166 N. Y. 292, 50 N. E. 906 (1901). See also Hollis v. Drew
Theo7ogical Seminary, 95 N. Y. 172 (1884); Messersmith v. American
Fidelity Co., 232 N. Y. 161 (1921).
26 Il., 299.
264 Ill. 110, 118, 105 N. E. 525 (1914).
1
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20
same Court in the recent case of Paris v. Schwartz. In Hood
21
the Georgia Supreme Court directly held that the
v. Legg
reasonableness of a contract is a matter of law. The plaintiff
sought an injunction to prevent the defendant's competing with
him in violation of contract. The matter was submitted to an
auditor who made a finding of law that the limits in the contract were reasonable. On the defendant's motion the Court
returned the question to the auditor for a finding as a matter
of fact. The Supreme Court in a strong opinion with many citations of precedents and text books, held that reasonableness is a
matter of law.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Thwosen v.
Cayser22 expressed the same view as to the province of the jury
in restraint of trade litigation. The case involved an action for
damages under the Sherman Act. The defendant's contention
was substantially that, admitting it was a combination in restraint of' trade, its motives were of the best. The defendant
also argued that the fact of combination should have been submitted to the jury. The Court's whole discussion assumes the
matter one of law-for the Court. On the specific point the
Court said: "The next contention is that the fact of combination
should have been submitted to the jury and not decided as a
matter of law by the Court. We are unable to assent. There
was no conflict in the evidence, nothing, therefore, for the jury
to pass upon; and the Court properly assumed the decision of
what -was done and its illegal effect."

The Supreme Court also in the late case of Twin Cit'y Pipe
Line Co. v. Harding Glass C0.23 indicates the impossibility of a
rule which would leave the issue of reasonableness to the jury
in restraint of trade cases. While the case involved an injunction to enjoin a violation of and specifically to enforce a contract, the real question was whether the contract was unenforceable because contrary to the public policy of the state of Ar- 344 Il1. 563, 570, 170 N. E. 757 (1931). See also Knight & Jillson
v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 35, 87 N. E. 823 (1909), in which the court said:
"Whether an agreement is in restraint of trade is a question of law

for the court."
2160 Ga. 620, 128 S. E. 891 (1927).
=243 U. S. 66 (1914).
'283 U. S. 353, 75 L. Ed. 1112 (1931). See also United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290, .40, 41 L. Ed. 1007, 1027
(1897).
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kansas. The Court in fact held the contract valid. In the course
of the opinion the Court said: "In determining whether the
contract . . . contravenes the public policy of Arkansas, the
constitution, laws and judicial decisions of that State and as
well the applicable principles of the common law are to be considered."
Imagine a trial court charging a jury in this fashion: "Gentlemen, you are to determine whether this contract is in restraint of trade and hence void. To be in restraint of trade it
must be contrary to public policy. In arriving at your verdict,
you are to consider the constitution of the State and of the
United States, the statutory declaration of the legislature and
the applicable principles of the common law."
The Common Pleas Court in the Stark County Milk Association case may have fallen into the error of submitting to the
jury the question of reasonableness because of the procedure
which seems to have been followed in List v. Burley Tobacco
Growers' Cooperative Association.24 This was a suit against a
member of the Association for liquidated damages growing out
of a failure of the member to deliver tobacco in accordance with
the marketing contract. The first judgment for the plaintiff
seems to have been given on the pleadings. On error to the
Court of. Appeals the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial upon the issue raised by a defense which
stated in substance that the contracts of the defendants and
others covered three-fourths of the aggregate production in the
state of Ohio, 'and fhat the purpose was to fix tobacco prices and
destroy competition, in violation of the Ohio Anti-Trust Law.
The Court of Appeals ruled that this raised an issue of fact upon
which the parties were entitled to introduce evidence. This
ruling of the Court of Appeals was obviously correct. Essential
facts were disputed. The Court of Appeals said nothing about
a jury's determining the question of reasonableness of a restraint
of trade.
Upon retrial of the issue, all the Supreme Court report
shows is that the cause was submitted to a jury, and a verdict
granted to the plaintiff. The report says absolutely nothing
as to what issues were submitted to the jury. If the trial court
submitted the question of reasonableness of the contract to the
24114 Oh. State 361, 151 N. E. 471 (1926).
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jury there is no showing that any exception was taken. No
such point was considered. in the long opinion of the Supreme
Court. This opinion was strongly in favor of the legality of
the Association's operations. The Supreme Court obviously regarded the real question as one of law. The List case in reality,
instead of supporting the conception of the province of the jury
in the Stark County Milk Association case, justifies precisely an
opposite conclusion.
IlL
Enough has been said to show that the decision of the Court
of Appeals in the Stark County case is erroneous even if the
Ohio Supreme Court refuses to consider the general question
relating to the contracts and operations of the Milk Association.
The substantial controversy back of this small case concerns of
course the Association's milk marketing program particularly
in respect to blended prices and equalization payments. If the
Ohio Supreme Court, as it did in List v. Burley Growers'
Tobacco Cooperative Association, decides to rule on the fundamental question of the legality of the Association's activities,
the Association seems entitled to a judgment and a vindication
of its purposes and methods. Since cooperative marketing of
milk involves some novel features not passed upon in the List
case, and since sporadic attacks on these methods will mean uncentainty and consequent litigation until a comprehensive decision is rendered, it is hoped that the Ohio Supreme Court will
expres§ an opinion upon the basic elements at issue.
The first thing to be noted is that the plaintiff was an agricultural cooperative milk association of producers, incorporated
under an Ohio statute granting such associations special privileges and immunities. Between 1921 and 1926 about 40 states
passed laws in aid of agricultural cooperation. Most of these
states, including Ohio, adopted the so-called standard act. The
Ohio law was enacted in 1923.25 Section 4 of this act sets out
the powers of cooperative associations incorporated under it.
The Section reads in part as follows:
"Section 4. Each association incorporated under this act shall
have the following powers:
"(a) To engage in any activity in connection with the marketing,
selling, preserving, harvesting, drying, processing, manufacturing, can'Supra, note (3).
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ning, packing, grading, storing, handling or utilization of any agricultural products produced or delivered to it by its members or others, or
the manufacturing or marketing of the by-products thereof."
"Any such association may limit its activities to the handling or
the marketing products of its own members, except for storage. If it
handles the products of non-members, such non-members' products
handled in any fiscal year must not exceed the total of similar products
handled by the association for its own members during the same
period."
"(c) To act as the agent or representative of any member or
members in any of the above mentioned activities."
"(e) To establish reserves and to invest the funds thereof in bonds
or in such other property as may be provided in the by-laws."
"(h) To do each any everything necessary, suitable or proper for
the accomplishment of any one of the purposes or the attainment of
anyone or more of the subjects herein enumerated; or conducive to
or expedient for the interest or benefit of the association; and to contract accordingly; and in addition to exercise and possess all powers,
rights and privileges necessary or incidental to the purposes for which
the association is organized or to the activities in which it is engaged;
and in addition, any other rights, powers and privileges granted by the
laws of this state to ordinary corporations, except such as are inconsistent with the express provisions of this act; and to do any such
thing anywhere." (Italics the writer's.)

Since at the time the Ohio Cooperative Marketing Association Law was passed there was on the Ohio statute books the
Valentine Anti-Trust Law, 26 a section was included in the cooperative statute attempting to make certain that the contracts
and essential activities of cooperative marketing associations
would not be attacked as in restraint of trade. This section is
Number 26 in the law and is quoted herewith:
"No association organizbd hereunder and complying with the terms
hereof shall be deemed to be a conspiracy or a combination in restraint
of trade or an illegal monopoly; or an attempt to lessen competition
or to fix prices arbitrarily nor shall the marketing contracts and
agreements between the association and its members or any agreements authorized in this act be considered illegal as such or in unlawful restraint of trade or as part of a conspiracy or combination to
accomplish an improper or illegal purpose." (Italics the writer's.)

Forty-seven states have passed laws enabling farmers
to act collectively in the marketing of their products. In all
these the implication is implicit in the law that action in accordance with the statute is not a violation of the statutory or common law in restraint of trade prevailing in the state. In 30 or
more states, particular sections have been included in their co2 Supra, note (2).
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operative statutes expressing substantially the exemption stated
27
in Section 26 of the Ohio law.
The existence in so many states of laws which, although
not constituting precisely a uniform act, have many identical
or similar features means that the judicial decisions of one state
interpreting a provision of the cooperative marketing act are
directly in point in cooperative association litigation in another
state. Although the cooperative statutes have been subjected
to many legal attacks judicial opinion in all state and Federal
courts has been substantially unanimous in upholding them.
Among these judicial opinions that of the Ohio Supreme
Court in List v. The Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Association28 is one of the most comprehensive. It has already
been mentioned that this case grew out of an action by the
Burley Association against a member for liquidated damages.
The Burley Association was organized under the Kentucky Cooperative Marketing Act, 29 a law substantially like the
Ohio cooperative association statute. The Burley Association
had a contract with its members by which the members agreed
to sell and deliver to the association all of the tobacco grown
by them or over which they had legal control, for five years
beginning in 1922 and ending in 1926. The Association agreement provided that it was not to be effective unless the Association should obtain by January 16, 1922, the signatures of tobacco
growers covering at least 3/4 of the Burley production in Kentucky, Indiana, Tennessee, and Ohio. The defendant attacked
this agreement as being an unreasonable restraint of trade and
monopolistic. To the extent that such contracts might be authorized under the Ohio cooperative marketing statute he alleged that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court,
one judge dissenting and one concurring only in the judgment,
upheld the validity of the membership contract in an opinion
which showed a sympathetic understanding of the problems of
agriculture and the principles of cooperative statutes. The
21See Hanna, Law of Cooperative Marketing Associations (1931)
106; 1933 Handbook Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Report
on proposed Uniform Agricultural Cooperative Association Act, as
drafted by the writer).
"4Supra,note (24).
21The Bingham Act, Ky. Laws 1922, c. 1; amended, Laws 1922,
c. 109; Laws 1924, c. 1, c. 7; Baldwin's Ky. Stats., 1928, Section 883f.
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Court considered the economic justification for encouraging associations of agricultural producers and said:
"We must look to the fact that persons engaged in agriculture
are widely scattered and compose so numerous a class that it is a
physical and economic impossibility to combine them all in any commercial enterprise, and we should further look to the fact that many
of them are very small producers of such limited means that they
must market their products immediately after harvesting, and are
therefore at the mercy of purchasers, without any voice whatever in
making prices or terms. It must be recognized on the other hand that
merchants and manufacturers dealing in any single line of agricultural
products are comparatively few and congregated in definite localities.
While this is not true of all agricultural production, it is certainly true
of the tobacco industry. Such different situations and conditions were
evidently considered by the legislatures of the different states and by
Congress, whose duty and province it is to consider the economic
problems involved. Such legislative acts should not be held to be invalid and unconstitutional, unless clearly violative of the constitutional
Inhibition.
"In the last analysis this controversy turns upon a question of
public policy. The earlier anti-trust legislation is being modified and
certain well-defined exemptions are being created. The earlier decisions
of the courts construing those acts strictly are being modified and
overturned by later decisions.

.

.

. Co-operative

marketing acts

have been passed by more than three-fourths of the states of the Union.
These enactments have been upheld by the courts of last resort of 15
states of the Union, and, up to this time, in not a single case have any
of such state laws been declared invalid."

The Kentucky statute involved in the List case came before
the Supreme Court of the United States in Liberty Warehouse
Company v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Marketing
Association.30 Two provisions of the Kentucky Act were at
issue. Section 26 made it a misdemeanor for any person knowingly to induce a member to violate his marketing contract. The
guilty party was also liable to the association in a penal sum.
Section 27 declared that a warehouseman who persauded or permitted a member to violate his contract by accepting the member's products for sale was liable to the association in a penal
sum.
One Kielman signed the standard cooperative contract with
the association, obliging himself to deliver to it all of his tobacco
from 1922 to 1926 inclusive. He broke his contract by delivering 2,000 pounds of 1923 tobacco to the Warehouse Company,
which accepted and sold it with full knowledge of the circum"' 276 U. S. 71, 72 L. Ed. 473 (1928). See Walton Hamilton,
"Judicial Tolerance of Farmers' Cooperatives" (1929), 38 Yale L. J.

936; Hanna, op. cit., supra, note (9).
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stances. The Association sued to recover the penalty fixed by
the statute. It was admitted that the warehouse company was
liable unless the provisions in question were unconstitutional.
The challenge of the company was that the sections deprived it
of its privileges, i. e., of its property, without due process of
law, and denied it. the equal protection of the laws. The court
pointed out that no right guaranteed by the Constitution was
impaired by the authorization of producer corporations nor by
the declaration that such corporations were not to be deemed in
restraint of trade. Moreover, the statute did not permit anyone
to induce a member to break his contract, nor did it prescribe
more rigorous penalties against warehousemen than against
others. There was therefore no substantial basis upon which to
invoke the equal protection clause.
The Kentucky Cooperative Marketing Act does afford peculiar protection to members' marketing contracts. Under Kentucky law all sorts of contracts are valid. If one induces the
breach of any valid contract he has connitted a tort. As to
cooperative contracts he has committed also a crime and his
offense entitles the association to a special civil remedy. The
question before the court therefore was whether the legislative
action in picking out these contracts for special protection was
without reasonable basis and arbitrary. That did bring before
the court for consideration the nature of cooperative
associations and the appropriateness of their functions. The
conclusion of the court was that the attacked sections of the law
were cbnstitutional. "Viewing all the circumstances, it is impossible for us to say that the legislature of Kentucky could not
treat marketing contracts between the associations and its members as of a separate class, provide against probable interference therewith and to that extent limit the sometime action of
warehousemen." From the standpoint of cooperative associations the most significant part of the decision was the friendly
attitude of the Court toward the cooperative movement. Mr.
Justice MeReynolds in delivering the Court's unanimous opinion quoted with approval from several state Supreme Court
decisions. One quotation was from Arkansas Cotton Growers'
a
Cooperative Association v. Brown: 1
"The statute seems to be in a form which has become standard,
and has been enacted in many of the states, the enactment of such
-1168 Ark. 504, 270 S. W. 946 (1925).
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legislation being manifestly prompted by the universal urge to promote
prosperity in agricultural pursuits. There has been much discussion
of the plan in the decisions of the courts of the various states where
it has been adopted, and the general view expressed is that the statute
should be liberally construed in order to carry out the design in its
broadest scope."
Another quotation was from Northern Wisconsin Co-Operative Tobacco Pool v. BekkedaZ :32
"The reasons for promoting such legislation are generally understood. It sprang from a general, if not well-nigh universal, belief that
the present system of marketing is expensive and wasteful and results in an unconscionable spread between what is paid the producer
and that charged the consumer. It was for the purpose of encouraging
efforts to bring about more direct marketing methods, thus benefiting
both producer and consumer and thereby promoting the general interest and the public welfare, that the legislation was enacted."

The court then added:
"The opinion generally accepted-and upon reasonable grounds,
we think-is that the cooperative marketing statutes promote the common interest."3'

One may take it as conclusively established by Federal and
state statutes and by the judicial interpretation of them that
public policy is strongly in favor of agricultural cooperative as-

sociations.

Most, but not all, of these producer owned corpora-

tions are marketing associations.

Some of the associations, in-

cluding many of the large cotton, wheat, tobacco and rice associations, buy the product of their members, make an initial payment when the product is delivered, sell the product in a program of orderly marketing, and make a final payment to the

member determined by the average price received for the grade
and quality the member has delivered. 34

Other associations act

as agents for their members. Some of these are merely mutually
owned commission houses, others obtain bids for the member's
products and follow his directions as to sales and prices.

9till

others act as bargaining associations with almost entire discretion as to price and time of delivery, subject of course to the
reserve control by the members which is inherent in the very
nature of the association.

Marketing methods differ widely in

different parts of the United States and for different products.
It

is obvious that if the cooperative movement is to have any

2182 Wis. 571, 197 N. W. 936 (1924).
-"The court cited numerous state cases in accord.
31 See Hanfia, Agricultural Cooperation in Tobacco (1934), 1 Law
and- Contemporary Problems 292.

COOPERATIVE XARKETING AND RESTRAINT OF TRADE

235

vitality, if the public policy expressed in statutes and decisions
in favor of cooperative marketing is to mean anything, associations must have complete freedom to adopt such selling programs as seem best suited to the actual situation. 35
A granting of extensive powers to agricultural cooperative
associations and the liberal interpretation of these authorizations do not mean that the associations are exempt from the law
in respect to restraints of trade. If an association by arbitrary
and oppressive measures tended to deprive the public of a reasonable supply of the product of its members at a fair price, if
it attempted to compel its members to agree to unwise restrictions of production, if its selling and other policies were designed to drive competitors out of business for reasons of spite
or revenge, or in general if the association acted in a high
handed manner having little relation to its fundamental purposes, the association might be enjoined from continuing its
restraints, contracts essentially connected with its unfair conduct might be avoided and in extreme cases the association itself

might be dissolved. 36
IV.

Cooperative associations engaged in the marketing and manufacturing of milk products numbered in 1931, 2,391 associa-

tions with 725,000 members doing an aggregate business of over
'Edwin G. Nourse, The Legal Status of Agricultural Cooperation
(1927), c. VII; Cooperative Marketing of Farm Products, Bull. No. 10
(1932), Federal Farm Board; L. S. Hulbert, Legal Phases of Cooperative Associations, U. S. Dept. of Agri. Bull. No. 1106, Oct., 1922, 23-47.
See Barns v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n., Inc., et al., 220
App. Div. 6-24, 222 N. Y. Supp. 294 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 4th Dept.,
1927); Duplex PrintingPress Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct.
172, 65 L. Ed. 349 (1921). In the latter case Mr. Justice Pitney, who
rendered the Court's opinion, said, discussing the Clayton Act:
"As to section six, it seems to us its principal importance in
this discussion is for what it does not authorize, and for the limit
it sets to the immunity conferred. The section assumes the normal
objects of a labor organization to be legitimate, and declares that
nothing in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of such organizations or to forbid their
members from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects; and
that such an organization shall not be held in itself-merely because of its existence and operation-to be an illegal combination
or conspiracy in restraint of trade. But there is nothing in the
section to exempt such an organization or its members from accountability where it or they depart from its normal and legitimate
objects and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in re-
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$620,000,000. This was' about 14 of the gross business done by
all cooperative associations in the United States. Fluid milk
marketing associations controlled the sale of approximately 2/5
of the fluid milk sold in the United States in 1931. This milk
had a value of more than $318,000,000.37 The cooperative associations marketing milk in the larger metropolitan markets do
not customarily sell milk directly to the consumers. To enter
the milk distribution business would require the associations to
obtain a large amount of capital to.purchase or duplicate existing facilities. This would not only bring about warfare between
the associations and the present milk dealers, but would result
in an uneconomic disruption of existing business organizations,
making for unemployment and other unfortunate consequences.
The tendency of the larger fluid milk associations is either to
confine their activities to acting as bargaining agencies for their
members or to supplement this bargaining function with the
operation of plants for the processing of surplus milk and the
manufacture of milk by-products.3 8 Under this plan the
straint of trade. And by no fair or permissible construction can it
be taken as authorizing any activity otherwise unlawfill, or enabling a normally lawful organization to become a cloak for an
illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade as defined
by the anti-trust laws."
"All these cases (citing many) agree that a combination or
agreement having for its object and purpose the restraint of or
undue interference with interstate trade or commerce is not a
legitimate object of a labor organization', nor a lawful means of
carrying out its objects. If the members of a 'labor organization,
either alone or in combination with others, enter into such a combination, they are as much subject to the Anti-Trust Law as any
one else, notwithstanding the provisions of section six."
In United States v. King, 250 F. 908 (D. Mass., 1916), members
of a Maine potato shippers association were indicted for what amounted
to a secondary boycott. They demurred to the indictment on the
ground that they were exempt under Section 6 of the Clayton Act.
Judge Norton said that it did not appear the defendants were producers and hence were not within the class described by Section 6.
He further stated: "Even if it were so, I do not think that the coercion
of outsiders by a secondary boycott . . . can be held to be a lawful
carrying out of the legitimate objects of such an association. That
act means, as I understand it, that organizations such as it describes,
are not to be dissolved and broken up as illegal, nor held to be combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade; but they are not
privileged to adopt methods of carrying on their business which are
not permitted to other lawful associations."
3SBulletin cit., note (35), supra, 62-66, 76, 77.
' Hutzel Metzger, Cooperative Marketing of Fluid Milk, U. S. Dept.
of Agri. Tech. Bull. No. 179 (May, 1930); Chris. L. Christensen, Pooling as Practiced by Cooperative Marketing Associations, U. S. Dept.
of Agri. Misc. Bull. No. 14 (April, 1929); Id. Farmers Coop. Associa-
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producer sells his milk to the distributor, for example a subsidiary.of the National Dairy Products Company. The producer is
paid by the distributor, but the price is determined as a result of
bargaining between the distributor and the association. The
actual price ultimately paid by the distributor, however, may
depend upon a further adjustment to be made between the distributor and the association depending upon the use to which
the milk is put. The producer thus receives a price for his product which is determined by the quality of the product delivered and not by the use made of it. This pooling or blending
of returns among the members of the association, is merely a
plan for distribution among those engaged in a common enterprise of the proceeds received from their common venture. The
method used by an association in distributing sales proceeds to
its producer-members and the agency which it employs to effectuate such distribution is strictly a matter of internal management and ordinarily has no relevance to a discussion of the
reasonableness of the association's operations as restraints of
trade. 39 If an association in the exercise of its corporate powers
adopts a scheme by which each produicer is to receive his equitable proportion of the sales proceeds of the milk of all the members this cannot be subjected to collateral attack but can only be
reviewed in an action by a member on the ground of fraud or
bad faith in the adoption of the plan. This elementary fact is
not altered because an association for purposes of economy and
simplicity utilizes existing distributing agencies as the means by
which the'proceeds of sales are actually paid to the members.
When a court is called upon to consider the reasonableness
tions in the U. S., U. S. Dept. of Agri. Circular No. 94 (Aug., 1929),
6-13; R W. Bartlett, Cooperation in Marketing Dairy Products (1931),
188-195, 205-208, 233, 239; Coop. Marketing-Report of Federal Trade
Commission, 1928, Sen. Doc. 95, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., c. IL
"'Washington Coop. Egg and Poultry Ass'n. v. Taylor, 122 Wash.
466, 210 P. 806 (1922); McCauley v. Arkansas Rice Growers' Coop.
Ass'n., 171 Ark. 1155, 287 S. W. 419 (1926); Tobacco Growers' Coop.
Ass'n. v. Jones, 185 N. C. 265, 117 S. E. 174 (1923); Dark Tobacco
Growers' Association v. Robertson, 84 Ind. App. 51, 150 N. E. 106
(1926); Kansas Wheat Growers' Association v. Charlet, 236 P. 657
(1929); Brannan v. Cooperative Association, 27 Ohio App. 426, 162
N. E. 453 (1927); Manchester Dairy System v. Hayward, 82 N. H. 193,
132 A. 12 (1926); Pierce County Dairymen's Association v. Templin,
124 Wash. 567, 215 P. 352 (1923); Oregon Growers' Cooperative Association v. Lentz, 107 Ore. 561, 212 P. 811 (1923); Harrell v. Cane
Growers, 160 Ga. 30, 126 S. E. 521 (1925). Hanna, op. cit., supra, note
(27), 261-270.
K. L. J.-3
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of the blended price, equalization payments or other business
practices of cooperative associations of milk producers, it is
highly relevant for the court to note the attitude toward these
practices which has been expressed not only by the cooperative
40
leaders themselves but by agricultural and marketing experts
in Federal and State Departments of Agriculture and universities, and by legislatures, legislative committees and other groups
representing the general public. The informed public opinion in
the states most deeply concerned with the problems of the dairy
industry is of course of peculiar significance.
Milk producing and milk distribution are major problems
in New York. In 1931 the farm income from dairy products in
New York was $150,000,000. The investment in its dairy farms
amounted to a billion dollars. The prosperity of its dairy farms
is of great significance to taxing authorities and investors, aside
from the importance to the urban centers of having an adequate
source of milk of good quality. New York farmers have had
nearly 50 years of experience with various forms of cooperative
handling of milk. In considering the reasonableness of the
blended price and other schemes of milk distribution, public
opinion in New York on these matters has a peculiar relevance.
A joint legislative committee of five members was created in
1932 by the New York Legislature to investigate -the milk industry. The Committee, headed by Senator Perley A. Pitcher.
created a technical organization with a research director and
legal counsel.41 Thirteen public hearings in eleven localities
were held. There were 267 appearances by 254 witnesses. The
testimony amounting to 2,350 pages with voluminous exhibits,
was digested in a report of 473 pages. 42 This was summarized
in ten pages of conclusions and recommendations.
The summary points out the importance of the milk industry and the public interest in milk because it contains in favorable combination, chemical and other properties which are essential to human life and health and is relatively the cheapest
40See op. cit. supra, note (38).
' The members of the Committee were Messrs. Perley A. Pitcher,
Frank G. Miller, Herbert A. Bartholomew, D. Mallory Stephens and
William T. Byrne. Two were Senators, three Assemblymen. Dr. Leland
Spencer of Cornell was Research Director and Editor, Messrs. James
T. Cross and T. Paul McGannon, Counsel and Assistant Counsel.
0 Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the
Milk Industry, N. Y. Leg. Doc. No. 114 (1933).
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source of these elements. 43 The public has also a vital concern
because milk is an excellent medium for the growth of bacteria
and the production and handling of milk for human consumption
must be safeguarded carefully to insure against contamination.
If the producers fail to receive a fair return, there is grave danger that the vigilance against contamination will be relaxed. The
summary also recognized that because milk is an essential food
and cannot be stored, the maintenance of a continuous supply,
adequate to meet the maximum demand, is of great importance
to the public health. Under the best practicable adjustment of
supply and demand the industry must carry a surplus of about
20 per cent. Milk must be available in the quantities demanded
by consumers from day to day and demand varies from dhy to
day. In addition to the customary surplus which must be provided to take care of peak load demands, other factors such as
seasonal freshening, conditioning of pastures, and overproduction of milk-cows, tend-to add to the surplus.
Surplus milk is a serious problem everywhere because the
prices which can be realized for it are much less than the prices
realized for milk and cream sold for consumption in fluid form.
Milk and cream for manufacturing may be stored, if not in its
original form, in other forms such as butter or milk powder.
Because of the different conditions of handling, it need not be
subjected to the details of inspection required for milk sold to
the homes. In New York, surplus milk products must be sold
in competition with those produced in regions where costs are
lower. On this question of surplus milk the Pitcher report
44
states:
"A satisfactory stabilization of prices for fluid milk requires (1)
that the burden of surplus milk be shared equally by all producers and
by all distributors in the milk shed. So long as the surplus burden is
unequally distributed the pressure to market surplus milk in fluid form
will be a serious disturbing factor; (2) that an united effort be made
to reduce the amount of the surplus to the minimum by adjusting the
supply of milk more closely to the demand. Obviously the production
of surplus milk in most parts of New York state constitutes an economic loss, and is only justified to the amount necessary to guarantee
a continuously adequate supply of fluid milk and cream in the available markets.
"The fact that the larger distributors find it necessary to carry
large quantities of surplus milk while the smaller distributors do not,
leads to price-cutting and other forms of destructive competition,
'3 !bid. 14.

"Ibid. 17.
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especially when the surplus is abnormally large. The small distributor
can contract for his minimum requirements and depend upon emergency purchases when threatened with a shortage. The larger distributors cannot do this since the same percentage deficiency in volume
would involve quantities too great to be obtained on short notice. The
result of this situation Is that the smaller distributors who take no
responsibility for the surplus, by purchasing their milk on the basis
of the blended prices paid by the larger organizations, are in a position
to undersell the larger distributors in the cities. .
"Among the remedies which might be applied to mitigate the evil
of price-cutting are: Universal application of the classified price plan
with uniform prices to ail milk dealers for milk utilized in each classification; the fixing of minimum prices to be charged by milk dealers
for milk and cream sold to consumers and other customers; the imposition of a graduated tax to be paid by milk dealers on their sales
of milk and cream in excess of the normal or average proportion of
the milk supply of the entire milk shed which is sold by the dealers
in fluid form."
"Universal application of the classified price plan and control of
surplus milk by the producers through effective cooperative organization appears to offer the best prospect for permanent stabilization of
the dairy industry in the New York milk shed." (Italics the Committee's.)

The committee went on to state that in its opinion probably
one centralized producers' organization could best accomplish
the recited purposes. In the meantime the committee recom45
mended the creation of a temporary state milk control board.
46
This recommendation was adopted by the Legislature.
- Ib id., 19.
46Laws of New York, 1933, c. 158, Agri. and Markets Law N. Y.
(Consol. Laws, c. 69), Section 312. This law has now been superseded
by Laws, 1934, c. 126. While the question of the constitutionality of
state milk control laws is not directly involved in the present discussion, much of the opinions of the New York Court of Appeals and
of the Supreme Court of the United States in sustaining the New York
Milk Control Act of 1933 is worth reading for the light it throws on
what methods of milk marketing are in accord with public policy. See
People v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (1933); Nebbia v. People,
54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 563 (1934). Of especial interest is
the recognition by the Supreme Court of the desirability of methods
for the control of surplus milk. In this connection, Mr. Justice
Roberts, in rendering the Court's opinion said: "The fluid milk industry is affected by factors of instability peculiar ,to itself
which call for special methods of control. Under the best practicable
adjustment of supply to demand the industry must carry- a surplus of. about 20 per cent, because milk, an essential food, must be
available as demanded by consumers every day in the year, and
demand and supply vary from day to day and according to the season; but milk is perishable and cannot be stored. Close adjustment of supply to demand is h indered by several factors difficult to
control. Thus surplus milk presents a serious problem, as the
prices which can be realized for it are much less than those obtainable"
for milk sold for consumption in fluid form or as cream. A satisfactory stabilization of prices for fluid milk requires that the burden
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The acti6n of the Ohio legislature also is directly in point
in determining .whether the activities challenged in the Stark
County Milk Association case are in unreasonable restraint of
trade. 4 7 While the Ohio AMlk Control Act was passed after the
contracts in the Stark County Milk.Association case were executed, if the public policy of the State was as declared by the
legislature in 1933 it was likely the same from 1928 to 1932.48
4e
In the case of Brown v. Staple Cotton Cooperative Association,
the contract at issue was made in 1921. The cooperative statute
was not passed until 1922, but the Court said:
"Although the Cooperative Marketing Act (Chapter 179 of the
Laws of 1922) does not and could not declare what the public policy
of the state was before its adoption, still it ought to be persuasive on
the courts as to what was inimicable to the public welfare at that
time, It embodies the judgment of the legislature recently after the
making of the contract involved. By it all such contracts for the future
are declared legal; they are authorized in order to promote what the
legislature thought was the public welfare. Was the public interest
one thing in Septmeber, 1921, when this contract was made, and another thing in the early part of 1922, when this statute.was passed?
We think not."

The Secretary of Agriculture under the Agricultural Adjustment Act is authorized to promulgate regulations for inter-:
state commerce in certain agricultural commodities including
of surplus milk be shared equally by all producers and all distributors
in the milk shed. So long as the surplus burden- is unequally distributed the pressure to market surplus milk in fluid form will be a
serious disturbing factor. The fact that the larger distributors find
it necessary to carry large quantities of surplus milk, while the
smaller distributors do not, leads to price-cutting and other forms of
destructive competition. Smaller distributors, who take no responsibility for the surplus, by purchasing their milk at the blended prices
(I. e., an average between the price paid the producer for milk for
sale as fluid milk, and the lower surplus milk price paid by the larger
organizations) can undersell the larger distributors. Indulgence in
this price-cutting often compels the larger dealer to cut the price to
his own and the producer's detriment."
The opinion continued with a reference to the methods suggested
for meeting this condition, including united action by producers, summarized and quoted from the New York law and upheld it, without,
however, holding that the milk industry is a public utility. See also
for an interesting discussion of the public utility aspects of the milk
business, the opinion of Marshall, J., in Fenley's Model Dairy v. Falls
Cities Coop. Milk Producers' Ass'n., Jefferson Circuit Court, Kentucky,
decided June 28, 1933 (unreported).
4TOhio Milk Control Act, Gen. Code, Sections 1080-1 to 1080-23, approved June 22, 1933. Cf. Pennsylvania Act of May 6,1925, as amended
by Act of April 7, 1927.
1 See "20 Years of Ohio Agriculture," Bull. No. 526, Ohio Agri.
Exp. Station (1931).
" 132 Miss. 859, 96 So. 849 (1923).
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milk,50 Under this authority the Secretary has issued licenses
for milk in various areas. The general terms of these licenses
are illustrated by the license for milk in the Chicago area. In
United States v. Shissler,51 the Federal Court for the Northern
District of Illinois recently granted an injunction against the
distribution of milk in violation of the Federal license. The following extract from the Court's opinion shows how the Agricultural Adjustment Administration has adopted the classified price
plan in a regulation approved by judicial sanction :52
"The license fixes the price which shall be paid by the dis.
tributor to the producer. As- the returns for fluid milk when sold to
the consumer vary, depending on whether it is sold to be consumed as
fluid milk, as cream, or in the form of butter, cheese, or other manufactured milk products, and as the aim of the secretary is to secure
the same price to each producer, no matter what the ultimate use of
his milk may be, whether sold to the consumer as whole milk or used
for the production of cream, butter, cheese, or other milk product, each
distributor is required by the terms of the license to report to the
Market Administrator, among other things, the names of the producers
from whom he has purchased milk, the quantities purchased from
each, the quantities sold by him, and the uses thereof, whether as
whole milk or for the production of cream, or for other purposes. By
the terms of the license the milk produced is divided into three classes,
according to its ultimate use. Class I is such milk as is sold by the
distributors as whole milk for consumption in the Chicago Sales Area.
Class II is that which is used by the distributors to produce cream for
sale by the distributors as cream for consumption in the Chicago Sales
Area. Class III comprises the milk purchased by the distributors in
excess of Class I and Class II and is used for the production of butter,
cheese, and other manufactured milk products.
"The license fixes a price for each class of milk. For Class I the
price is $1.75 per hundred-weight; for Class II, a price of $1.25 per
hundred-weight; and for Class III, three and one-half times the average
price of ninety-two score butter at wholesale in the Chicago "market
as reported daily by the United States Department of Agriculture for
the calendar month during which the milk is purchased plus four
cents. From the reports the Market Administrator computes the
blended or average price of the milk sold by the various producers to
the distributors (certain other matters being taken into consideration
which need not be mentioned here) and reports the same to the distributors, who then are required to pay such average price to each
producer no matter what the use to which the particular producer's
milk was put. As a result of this process, each producer gets the same
price for the milk sold by him as every other producer, but. a distributor whose milk has been used for the production of butter, cheese,
etc., has paid more for his milk than he ghould, while one whose milk
has been used as whole milk has paid less. To equalize these differences, the Market Administrator sets up an adjustment accdunt for
each distributor. Those who have paid too little are required to pay
517 U. S. C. A., Sections 601-619; Gen. Regulations, A. A. A. Series
4, Revision 1.
517 F. Supp. 123 (1934).
" Ibid., 125.
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the balance to the Market Administrator and he, from the funds so
furnished, reimburses those who have paid too much."

These references to the New York, Ohio and Federal adoption of the classified price plan could be supplemented by a
showing of the current practices in practically every important
milk shed in the United States.5 3 When one considers the manifest policy of the cooperative statutes to encourage cooperative
marketing,5 4 it is clear that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that a cooperative association is acting in unreasonable restraint of trade, a court should not refuse to enforce its
contracts whether with members or others. When one adds the
fact that the methods and devices under attack are in general
and increasing use with the approval and even at the direction
of all sorts of public authorities, for a court in a particular locality to penalize these practices by denying to a cooperative association the right to enforce its contracts, represents a signal failure of justice.5 5 Whatever the court may feel about the wisdom
of a cooperative association's policies, so long as the cooperative
association is merely following a program, which has received
general acceptance, the court cannot find the incidental restrictions imposed by such. a program to be unreasonable restraints
of trade.
V.
Finally, if the classified price plan and the method of
equalization payments were presented to a court without a citation of precedents, the essential fairness and reasonableness of
these devices are enough to justify a court in upholding them.
Milk is an indispensible but highly perishable food. This
raises a whole set of questions that do not apply to other food
'"The Federal approval of the classified price plan dates at least
from the policies of the Food Administration'under Herbert Hoover
during the war. See report of the Federal Trade Commission on Milk
and Milk Products, 1914-1918 (1921), c. V.
"Cf. in addition to the state cooperative association statutes, the
Clayton Act (15 U. S. C. A. 41), the Capper-Volstead Act of Feb. 18,
1922 (7 U. S. C. A. 291, 292), Cooperative Marketing Act of July 2,
1926 (7 U. S. C. A. 455), and various revenue and appropriation acts.
The annual publications of the American Institute of Cooperatives contain much valuable data on milk marketing. See especially
Charles W. Holman, Progress and Status of Dairy Cooperatives in the
United States, II American Cooperation (1927), 5 et seq., and the
symposium on dairy marketing problems by various agricultural
authorities in American Cooperation (1933), 285-345.
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products.

On this point Dr. H. A. Ross5G makes the following

comment:

"Due to its high perishability milk cannot be stored in its natural
form as can apples, potatoes, or wheat. It is unlike these crops also
in that there is a continual supply instead of an annual harvest. If
production exceeds the fluid-milk demand, the surplus is manufactur-d
into less perishable products which find ready sale in world markets.
The price obtained for this surplus milk, however, is usually less than
that paid for fluid milk in city markets. This is particularly true in
New York, where butter, cheese and condensed milk produced under
conditions of high cost, must compete in the open market with the
same products from the cheaper producing regions of the mid-west.
It costs less to ship a pound of butter from Iowa to New York, than to
ship sufficient corn to produce that amount of butter here. Nevertheless, the availability of extensive pasture areas in the state of New
York has resulted in the development of a dairy industry which, during the greater part of the year, supplies far more milk than consumed
in fluid form by the great urban population of the nearby cities.
These cities have been demanding more and more milk each year,
but even in 1925 only 52.1 per cent of the milk handled in New York
milk plants was- used as fluid milk. During the same year, however,
there was a period when the New York City supply was barely adequate to meet the demand for fluid milk. That is, supply and demand
are not in adjustment, and seasons of shortage alternate with seasons
of surplus."
Professor G. F. Warren's observations5

7

are pertinent in

the same connection:
"Since milk Is essential, the public will not tolerate an excessive
rise in.
price merely because there is a short supply. It is not feasible
to have prices fluctuate from day to day as prices of butter, eggs and
potatoes do. At the steady price which is ordinarily maintained week
after week, consumers' demands vary with the day of the week, with
holidays, with temperature, and with movements in and out of the
city. The hotter the August day, the less milk the cows give and the
more milk the people drink. This makes a problem that does not
exist with other farm products. There must always be a necessary
surplus. This is generally estimated at about 20 per cent.
"To produce and handle milk suitable for use as fluid milk is far
more expensive than to produce it for manufacturing purposes. This
surplus must, therefore, be sold at a loss. But the problem is still
more difficult. Farmers cannot know in advance Just how much milk
they will produce because the wheather and other factorg affect the
cows. To be sure to have the necessary surplus, farmers must take a
chance of having still more if conditions should be favorable.
"There was a time when the requirements for producing fluid milk
were so little more than the requirements for producing butter, that
any milk that would run was ready on any day to be added to the
fluid milk supply. Under such conditions, the price of fluid milk was
determined by the pried of by-products. It is now essential to recognize
GaRoss, The Demand Side of the New York Milk Market, Bull.
No. 459, Cornell Univ. Agri. Experiment Sta. (1927), 3-4.
" Testimony before Joint Legislative Committee, Pitcher Report,
cit. supra, note (39).
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that the production of fluid milk is an entirely different industry from
the production of butter and cheese. It is an industry that has to assume an obligation to provide an adequate supply at all times-somewhat like the railroads or the electrical industry."

In the days of individual marketing the dealers usually
purchased their milk from farmers on a flat price plan; that is,
the dealer would contract with the individual farmers to take all
of their milk at a certain price regardless of whether the dealer
used the milk for sale in bottles, converted it into cream, or used
it in the manufacture of butter, cheese, e-Vaporated or condensed
milk, ice cream, or other manufactured products. Under this
plan the dealer, naturally, for his own protection, fixed the price
in accordance with the returns which he could obtain for the
milk when sold in the cheapest form, that is, for manufacturing purposes. Getting his milk then for the lowest price possible the dealer was able to obtain a larger return and greater
profit for that milk which he sold as cream, and in a like manner
that milk which he sold in bottles for fluid consumption brought
him a still greater measure of profit. At the same time the individual farmers had no way of sharing in the higher returns
which the dealer obtained from the milk sold for cream or for
fluid consumption.
The answer of the cooperatives to the problem of mlaintaining an adequate supply without compelling the producer to bear
the whole burden of the surplus has been the establishment of
the classified price plan. The President of the New York Dqirymen's League recently explained the operations of the plan, 58 as
follows:
"Beginning with its operations under the pooling plan in 1921, the
association adopted the policy, which is still being used, of selling its
milk to dealers with country plants under the classified price plan.
This plan, in brief, provides for four general classes of milk: Classes
1, 2, 3 and 4. Each class has subdivisions but in broad terms such
plan provides for payment by the dealer for all milk received from the
producers on the basis of the Class 1 price to the extent that dealers
are able to use the milk for sale in the fluid.form.
"If more milk is received than is sold in the fluid form and part
of it is made into cream, then it pays a Class 2 price which is a lesser
price than Class 1 and is based upon the prevailing market price for
cream. If the dealer still receives an additional supply of milk from
the association's producers, over and above its requirements for
Classes 1 and 2 and manufactures same in certain forms such as
condensed or evaporated milk or certain kinds of soft cheese, then it
pays the Class 3 price which is based upon the market price for milk
6 Testimony of F. I. Sexauer, ibid. 111-112.
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sold to condensers in the West, the difference in freight rates being
considered in fixing such price.
"If the dealer does not have facilities for manufacturing such
milk for products mentioned under Class 3, or, does not so manufacture, and uses the additional milk for manufacture into cheeses or
butter, he pays Class 4 prices which are based upon the market price
for cheese or butter in accordance with the actual disposition of the
milk, less a deduction to cover the cost of manufacturing.
"Under this classified price plan, the dealer does not have to bear
the burden of surplus. The producers, through their association, bear
the burden, and in turn, the dealer pays a fair and reasonable price
for the milk which he sells as fluid milk, namely: Class 1. The dealer
is assured at all times of sufficient milk to supply his market requirements and 'If he does not receive sufficient milk from his country
plants, he is able to purchase additional supplies from the association
on the regular platform and through shipment from the association's
country plants.
"Under this classification plan of sale, although the producers bore
the burden of surplus, the surplus has not depressed the relative price
of fluid milk as prior to 1921 when the market price for condensed
milk governed the fluid milk price. An analysis of prevailing prices
in the Central West and in the New York milk shed clearly discloses
that from May, 1921, when the classified price plan went into effect, to
April 1, 1932, the producers of the association received approximately
$116,800,000 more for their milk than they would have received on
the basis of prices paid by condensers."

The classified price plan has certain manifest advantages
to the producer. Each producer is assured a market for his
product all of the time. He knows in advance that he will enjoy
full participation in the fluid milk outlets of the region. He
also knows then that his share of responsibility for the surplus
represents a just allocation in which he is on the same basis as
other producers. A single, -widely known uniform price is available to producers throughout the milk shed, subject only to differentials for butterfat and transportation costs.
The plan is fair to the distributor because under it, each
distributor can buy and pay for the exact amount of milk he
needs in each class to fill his market requirements. The success
of the distributor thus depends upon his efficiency as an operator, and his skill as a salesman. The advantage to the consumer
is that he is assured an adequate supply of high quality milk at
a fair price.
If the milk cooperative associations adopt a distribution
plan which accomplishes desirable ends without resulting in any
of the features commonly associated with unreasonable restraints of trade, such as high prices, poor quality, insufficient
output, discrimination and coercion, the plan cannot be called
illegal under the statute or common law. Considering the ends in
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view, there seems little doubt that the cooperative associations
could go much further in their control of milk production and
distribution, even involving reasonable restrictions of output, fixing of minimum and maximum prices, limitation of distributing
agencies, without making their restraints unreasonable. As the
Court said in Barns v. Dairymen's League Gooperation Association :59
"It is a question, not of technical constitutional law, but of social
policy. It is true that if, under the cover of this beneficient policy, the
farmers should develop an organiiation that absolutely controlled the
price of dairy products and other farm products, and raised those
prices to an unconscionable height, and indulged in the human greed
which often accompanies monopoly, then it is not only probable, but
quite certain that the state would withdraw the protection of these
exemptions, and would require the farmers to come under the same
laws as other business men."
"I am convinced that our courts, like the United States Supreme
Court since the decision in Standard Oil of N. J. v. United States,O and
Mocker v. American Tobacco Co.,61 will apply the "rule of reason" to
every combination or agreement brought before them. Before it will
condemn, there must appear the elements of injury to the public, or
monopolistic control of a particular article of commerce, or unreasonable Interference with and damage to the business of an individual,
or the doing of illegal or unconscionable acts, or specific intent to do
Injury to someone else, or, in brief, at least some of those circumstances which would lead a court in good conscience to say that a
given set of defendants were overstepping the bounds of reasonable
ambition and fair play, and were becoming a nuisance to their fellow
men."
Note: The Supreme Court of Ohio, on December 26, 1934 reversed
the lower court's decision in The Stark County Milk Producers Association v. Tabeling, The Massillon Pure Milk Company and sent the
case back for a new trial. The Court stated that milk contracts, such
as were before it, are not void as against public policy, or in violation
of the anti-trust laws of Ohio, unless such contracts are unreasonable
as to character, scope or operation. The Court recognized the necessity
of blended prices in milk dealings and referred approvingly to the reports of various fact finding bodies concerned with the milk industry.
The Court substantially adopted the plaintiff's position that it was for
the Court and not for the jury to determine the reasonableness of any
alleged restraint of trade, although the Court also recognized that notwithstanding the cooperative statutes contracts of an agricultural cooperative association might be invalid because of the unreasonableness
of the restraint. On the facts of the particular case the Court pointed
out that although the contracts of the Association, or amendments to
these contracts, might be in unreasonable restraint of trade that would
not necessarily excuse the defendant from paying for his milk. The
case was reversed and remanded particularly for errors in the instructions by the lower court.
'Supra, note (36).
0221 U. S. 1 (1911).
1221 U. S. 106 (1911).

